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Abstract 
The Human Development Report 2007/8 (HDR) and the World 
Development Report 2010 (WDR) are both devoted to the connections 
between climate change and development. The reports provide very different 
perspectives on where the key challenges reside. Their policy proposals are also 
different, but much less so. The paper investigates these dissimilarities and 
similarities, and explores the framings in the Overviews of the two reports. It 
compares their conceptions of development, their normative content, the role 
given to human rights, and the status of proposed market solutions to issues of 
climate change and development. It ends by asking why, when the problem 
framings so significantly differ, the proposed solutions differed far less. 
Keywords 
Climate change; problem- and policy-frames; human rights; United Nations 
Development Programme; World Bank 
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Climate change and development framings1 
-- a comparative analysis of the Human Development Report 
2007/8 and the World Development Report 2010 
 
1 Climate solidarity versus climate smartness 
Multilateral organizations working on development issues and poverty 
reduction have started to assess the challenges that climate change poses to 
their work. Poor people are more directly dependent on nature and thus more 
vulnerable to environmental degradations; they are the first and most severely 
affected by climate change impacts. Moreover, they are more likely to be 
negatively affected by policy responses to climate change, from forest 
protection and agrofuels cultivation to mining in newly glacier-free areas. The 
Reports of the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change 
(UNFCC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have 
shown how the relations between development pathways and climate change 
vulnerability, adaptation and impacts are amongst the fundamental challenges 
for our generation and those that will follow. The warming of the atmosphere 
and the consequences for weather patterns, onset of seasons, new parasites and 
pests affecting crops, availability of food and water, increases and changes in 
disease vectors, and more frequent severe weather events and disasters, 
amongst other impacts, affect more strongly the low-latitude developing 
countries and poor people and communities across the planet.   
These impacts are the result of models of development that have been 
pursued by advanced economies for centuries and that have underpinned 
development strategies and aid polices since 1945. The attempts to mitigate 
climate change also have enormous consequences for developing countries and 
on people who are already vulnerable because of non-climate stressors. The 
inverse relation between vulnerability to climate change and responsibility for 
the change, together with the prevalence of advocacy of market-based growth 
as the leading tool to address both poverty and climate change, makes this set 
of issues deeply contentious.  
Diverse perspectives and narratives have emerged. How are climate 
change, the meaning of progress, and models of development specified? How 
does climate change discussion link to ideas of human rights? What pathways 
and solutions do various agencies defend, and how protective are they of the 
poor? What types of informational basis and expert perspective are prioritized 
and why, and which issues are neglected?  
That development institutions now respond to the challenge of climate 
change in conscious relation to development, aiming to tackle all issues in a 
synergetic way, is of utmost importance. Previously the global debate on 
climate change solutions had not given much attention to the poor and 
                                                 
1  This paper is part of a research project funded by the Norwegian Research Council. 
Our thanks go to Desmond McNeill for valuable comments and to Trine Dahl and 
Kirsti Fløttum for some content-analysis suggestions and other helpful discussion. 
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underdevelopment. However, the emergent discourse linking these issues may 
fail to question the models of progress and development that have led to the 
climate crises in the first place.  
Two institutions lead the debates in multilateral global development 
policy, providing perspectives that often cascade to other agencies and 
governments around the world:  the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the World Bank. In 2007 UNDP published its Human Development 
Report 2007/8 on the connections between climate change and development, 
the HDR 2007/8. The World Bank followed with the World Development Report 
2010: Development and Climate Change, WDR 2010 (published in 2009). 
This paper compares the Overviews of these two reports.2 We focus on 
their key terms and ideas, framing choices, similarities and differences. While 
giving some attention to the Reports as a whole, which are of book-length, we 
concentrate on the very substantial Overviews. These parts are by far the most 
read and most influential, and are the most carefully prepared, including 
through an interplay between knowledge and politics that is typical for 
multilateral organizations (St. Clair, 2006a).3  The two Overviews are large self-
contained pieces, of very comparable scale (around 25 pages with about 600 
words on a text-only page) and make little or no explicit reference to the rest 
of the report that they summarise. Close reading and content analysis of the 
Overviews provide insights into different worldviews that are prominent in the 
climate and development debate. 
The HDR uses the same title for its Report and its Overview: Fighting Climate 
Change – Human solidarity in a divided world. The title provides an ethical and 
political message about struggle, division, and overcoming that division in 
order to face a shared crisis. It appeals to ideals of bravery, solidarity and 
human community. The Overview maintains this style. It opens with a 
quotation from Martin Luther King Jr., which urges people to confront ‘the 
fierce urgency of now’ and to take action, for ‘Over the bleached bones and 
jumbled residues of numerous civilizations are written the pathetic words: Too 
late.’ (p.7). The Report cites Gandhi and Chico Mendes in similar ways. Its call 
for solidarity is reflected in frequent use of the word ‘we’, which appears vastly 
more often in its Overview than in the WDR Overview (56 usages versus 11).4 
                                                 
2  The HDR Overview is available in two versions: as part of the full report (pp.1-18), 
and as a longer self-standing document on the HDR website (pp.7-30 of a 31 page 
‘Summary’ file that also contains tables, diagrams, the frontmatter, Foreword, contents 
list, etc.). Page references and wordcounts that we give in this paper are to the self-
standing version, since that is more comparable to the WDR Overview, which also 
contains tables and diagrams; we add page references to the full report version in 
square brackets. Wordcounts for the WDR Overview (pp.1-29) exclude its References 
section, since the HDR Overview has no such section, and could indeed also exclude 
the Notes section (pp.26-29) for the same reason. 
3  Indeed, the Overviews of international agency reports sometimes contain significant 
divergences from the main report in emphasis and even in message; see for example 
the World Development Report 2006 on Equity and Development, analysed by 
McNeill and St. Clair 2011. 
4  In addition the Foreword to HDR 2007/8 includes no fewer than 28 uses of ‘we’, 
within three pages.  
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In contrast, the WDR 2010 adopts a bland Report title: Development and 
Climate Change. It sees a ‘challenge’ not a ‘fight’ (p.18). Its Overview has a 
separate title, Changing the Climate for Development, which conveys, first, that 
climate change affects the prospects for development; and, second, that the 
Report describes how to manage the climate in order to achieve or enhance 
development. The word ‘climate’ can be understood as meteorological features, 
and as the conditions that influence development such as institutions, markets, 
political stability. The WDR offers a more heavily technical perspective than 
the HDR, even if this is less marked in the Overview than in the rest of the 
report, which provides an enormous amount of detail, requiring readers to be 
versed in microeconomics and environmental issues in order to understand 
some sections. Its message is not a political and ethical statement asserting a 
We, but a managerialist ‘Can-Do’ that matches the World Bank’s predominant 
technocratic-bureaucratic style and reflects a framing of climate change as a 
challenge that can be tamed with sufficient funds and technology (O’Brien et 
al. 2009; McNeill and St. Clair, 2009). The word ‘can’ appears more than twice 
as often in the WDR Overview than in the HDR one (77 uses versus 32). The 
WDR in effect takes as its motto ‘a climate-smart world is within reach’ (p.10; 
& p.4).  
Overall, the HDR 2007/8 has more ethical and political orientation, 
consistent with the capability approach that underpins the HDR series. While 
the Overview does not use the term ‘ethical’ or ‘ethics’, ‘moral’ appears three 
times, ‘justice’ seven times (usually as ‘social justice’) and ‘human rights’ eleven 
times. It includes strong and repeated messages on ‘social justice and respect of 
human rights’ (p.13 [6]), and speaks of an impending ‘moral failure on a scale 
unparalleled in history’ (p.8 [2]) if we fail to prevent runaway climate change.  
The WDR Overview makes no use whatsoever of the terms ‘ethical’, 
‘moral’, ‘justice’, ‘human development’, ‘human security’ or even ‘human 
rights’. ‘Climate-smart’, a term that conveys technocratic orientation and can-
do ability, appears nine times, versus not at all in the HDR Overview. ‘Equity’ 
and ‘equitable’ are the WDR’s preferred normative terms, appearing 15 times, 
versus twice in the HDR Overview. The WDR Overview uses even the terms 
‘political’ and ‘politically’ just six times (compared to 23 times in the HDR 
Overview) and focuses instead on economic growth (85% of its 26 uses of 
‘growth’ concern economic growth; compared to 57% of the 23 HDR 
Overview uses), and on ‘efficiency’ or ‘efficient’ (48 uses, compared to 21). 
The WDR Overview’s fourth sentence thus asserts: ‘Critical to the 
progress [in reducing poverty, lengthening lives and improving nutrition is]: 
rapid economic growth’ (p.1). This is repeated often (for example: ‘Economic 
growth is necessary to reduce poverty’, p.7). However, in long periods in many 
countries major economic growth did not lead to such progress, and several 
other countries had periods of major progress without rapid economic growth. 
The WDR itself later notes how ‘Creating social safety nets in countries that do 
not yet have them is critical, and Bangladesh shows how it can be done even in 
very poor countries’ (p.13). The WDR conceals issues by referring to ‘growth 
and poverty alleviation’ as an indissoluble package, which it treats as a singular 
noun not a plural (p.1). 
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The WDR Overview also gives much emphasis to economic calculations 
of efficiency and returns. It cites ‘a global average GDP loss of about 1 
percent’ from climate change (p.5); and gives only one sentence at the end of a 
paragraph to the expected deaths from business-as-usual economic expansion: 
‘And over 3 million additional people could die from malnutrition each year.’ 
(p.5). In contrast, the HDR focuses on human impacts more than on GDP. 
The first page of its Foreword says: ‘In terms of aggregate world GDP, these 
short term effects may not be large. But for some of the world’s poorest 
people, the consequences could be apocalyptic.’ (p.3 [v]). 
Our paper probes these radical differences in style and declared priorities, 
and asks how far the two Reports differ in reality as policy frameworks. In 
other words, besides the evident dissimilarities, are there also important 
similarities? The paper undertakes a frame- and content- analysis (Alexander, 
2009; Schmidt, 2006; Yanow, 2000). Section 2 presents the contexts—
organisational, intellectual and situational—for reading and interpreting the 
reports. Section 3 compares the problem diagnoses in the two Overviews; how 
they frame the crisis/challenge of climate change. Section 4 then compares 
how they frame the approach to policy in response to that problem. Section 5 
sums up our key arguments and notes areas for further work. 
2 Organizational, intellectual and situational contexts 
Global development organizations attempt to be agenda-setters, norm-setters, 
and knowledge-brokers. They operate in a global arena of multiple actors that 
try to exert influence through use of discursive as well as material power. 
Documents such as the annual Development Reports form key channels for 
this and compete for legitimacy and attention, aiming to demonstrate expertise 
on concrete issues. Both our chosen Reports were launched shortly before a 
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP) annual meeting. The HDR 2007/8 
appeared in advance of the December 2007 COP 14 in Bali, and the WDR 
2010 appeared already in September 2009, before the COP 15 in Copenhagen. 
The United Nations Development Programme has evolved from an 
agency created to coordinate UN technical and scientific assistance to less 
developed countries (LDCs) on a project basis, to become a policy agency that 
provides advice, advocacy and resources. It has achieved an intellectual 
leadership role since the creation of the Human Development Report Office 
(HDRO), which has published the annual global Human Development Report 
from 1990 onwards. Its ‘human development paradigm’ was the result of a 
partnership between especially the late Mahbub ul Haq (the first HDRO 
Director) and Amartya Sen. ‘Human development’ has become a morally 
grounded conception of development, supported by Sen’s capability approach 
that conceptualises development as the extension of the range of attainable 
‘doings and beings’ that people have reason to value. An orientation also to 
human rights grew under later HDRO directors, including from 2004 to 2008 
Kevin Watkins, former research director of Oxfam. Watkins was lead author 
for the HDR 2007/8.  
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The HDRs’ novel perspective relies on the independent position of the 
HDRO vis a vis the governments in the board of UNDP. The HDRO is a 
relatively small unit officially outside UNDP. This gives it more freedom to 
criticise the status quo, though it often limits the ‘clout’ that its ideas have at 
country level (McNeill and St.Clair, 2009). While the human development 
paradigm has helped to revive UNDP as a leading multilateral (Murphy 2006) 
despite its tiny funding compared to the World Bank, this does not mean it 
readily achieves policy influence. 
In contrast to the HDRs, the World Development Reports are the official 
flagship publication of the World Bank’s research and data arm, the 
Development Economics Vice-Presidency (DEC), and are supervised by the 
Chief Economist. World Development Reports position the Bank as an expert 
in global debates about development and poverty reduction. The Bank is the 
largest source of knowledge for development worldwide, given its enormous 
research budget and capacity to access financing for events, and has direct and 
major influence on policy-making in client countries’ governments. However, 
scholars who have explored the Bank’s knowledge production processes 
describe them as circular, self-referential, cognitively narrow, and dominated by 
reductionist economic thinking (Broad 2006, Mosse 2011, McNeill and St.Clair 
2009, 2011, St.Clair 2006a, 2006b, Stone and Wright 2006, Wade 2002). 
Unusually though, the 2010 WDR was co-directed by Rosina Bierbaum, Dean 
of Environment at the University of Michigan, working with  Bank economist 
Marianne Fay. Draft WDRs are still scrutinized by country representatives in 
the Board of Governors and must be approved by the Executive Board of 
Directors. They tend to become statements of the ‘institutional message’.  
Because of the need to maintain a sense of coherence in an organization that is 
highly heterogeneous and complex, new ideas and themes tend to be built upon 
older and well established Bank ideas and discourse; critical views are excluded, 
in a process of what Broad (2006; following Wade 1996) calls ‘the art of 
paradigm maintenance’. Where disagreement arises, consensus is reached through 
internal negotiation and contestation processes; however, these are not 
transparent, but rather take place in closed-door meetings. Ideas that are not 
suited to the tools of analysis and instruments of policy of the Bank (for example, 
the role of human rights in bringing about fair development processes) tend to 
be excluded. (McNeill & St.Clair, 2011: 104). 
Similarly, the core business of the Bank—promoting and funding huge 
investments often in fossil-fuel based sectors, as in the recent $3 billion loan 
for the coal-fired Medupi power plant in South Africa—typically overshadows 
its intellectual engagement in issues of climate change (Storm, 2011). 
The Bank has sections that promote more socially aware perspectives. For 
example, the former head of the social development department, Steen 
Jorgensen, co-authored a paper that argues for a ‘no regrets’ approach and an 
important role for social protection mechanisms in addressing human 
vulnerability to climate change (Heltberg, Siegel, and Jorgensen, 2009). But 
‘adaptation for whom?’ is not a key concern in the Overview of the WDR 
2010. The WDR fits instead with the Strategic Framework for the World Bank 
Group (WBG), which represents the formal institutional position of the Bank. 
This states that the Bank can no longer avoid addressing climate change as part 
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of its ongoing work on poverty reduction and development, but that its 
mandate is to focus on building growth and reducing poverty (St.Clair, 2009). 
It aims to ‘effectively support sustainable development and poverty reduction 
at the national, regional, and local levels, as additional climate risks and climate-
related economic opportunities arise’ (World Bank, 2008:5). The document 
emphasises expanding business opportunities in relation to energy efficiency, 
but stresses that ‘resources will not be diverted from financing core 
development needs’ (World Bank, 2008: 5).   
Since the 1990s, the gap in ideas between these two multilateral 
organizations has reduced, as the Bank has increasingly opened up to 
acknowledging the complexity of development processes and the 
multidimensionality of poverty. However, although both organizations endorse 
the target of reducing emissions so that warming does not exceed a 2 degrees 
average, the two have moved apart in how they frame the challenge of climate 
change in relation to development, as evidenced by their views in these reports, 
as we see next.  
3 Framing the problem 
In exploring how the issue of climate change is framed in each report, we start 
with the importance given to the problem and for whom and for what it is 
considered a problem – for economic growth, for equity and human rights, for 
poor people and future generations? We analyse the links seen between climate 
and development, with attention to meanings attached to ‘development’ and 
the specification of causal linkages and structural rigidities, and the related 
degree of urgency. We look subsequently at what understanding of 
vulnerabilities and responsibilities the Reports offer, and at their uses of the 
term ‘efficiency’ and its role in directing attention to activities in poor rather 
than rich countries. The WDR in particular emphasises rigidities in rich 
economies and an efficiency case to focus on influencing change in low-
income economies which have more degrees of freedom. Lastly, we see how 
far the reports consider the issue in terms of human rights. 
3.1 Importance and urgency of climate change – and 
importance for whom? 
The HDR presents climate change as the most urgent and grave problem of 
our times. The ‘battle’ against it ‘is part of the fight for humanity’ (p.13 [6]).5 
The Foreword of the HDR makes a call to ‘act now’ (p.3 [v]), while the 
opening page of the Overview states (in 2007) that ‘The world has less than a 
decade to change course’ (p.7 [1]); its conclusion section portrays climate 
change as perhaps ‘the gravest threat ever to have faced humanity’ (HDR p.27 
[15]). The Overview uses the term ‘danger’ or ‘dangerous’ in combination with 
‘climate change’ 27 times compared to only three times in the WDR Overview 
(plus twice in its Notes). 
                                                 
5  The HDR Overview uses ‘fight’ or ‘fighting’ nine times, apart from in its title, and 
‘battle’ six times. The WDR Overview never uses either term. 
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The HDR views climate change as an ‘outrage to the conscience of 
mankind’ (p.10 [4]). Specifically, it highlights it as an inter-generational issue: 
‘our generation is running up an unsustainable ecological debt’ (p.9 [3]); also as 
a human rights issue: to allow runaway climate change ‘would represent a 
systematic violation of the human rights of the world’s poor and future 
generations’ (p.10 [4]); and as a human development issue: ‘doing nothing 
offers a guaranteed route to […] mutually assured destruction of human 
development potential’ (p.12 [5]). It repeatedly uses ‘blunt’ language, including 
condemning the ‘complacency and prevarication that continues to characterize 
international negotiations on climate change’ (p.13 [6]). 
Underpinning this impatience is a notion of threshold: a danger point 
beyond which damage greatly accelerates.6 The idea can have its own dangers. 
First, as the HDR also notes (e.g., in Ch.1), use of the idea sometimes elides 
the issue of ‘dangerous for whom?’ A stage of climate change that is not 
immediately dangerous for most of the affluent is already past the danger point 
for millions of poor people: ‘262 million people were affected by climate 
disasters annually from 2000 to 2004, over 98 percent of them in the 
developing world’ (p.16 [8]); and ‘The 1 billion people currently living in urban 
slums on fragile hillsides or flood prone river banks face acute vulnerabilities’ 
(p.18 [9]). Nor are these temporary dangers, since much of the human 
development damage is irreversible (p.19 [10]); being born in a drought year in 
a poor country, for example, markedly increases one’s likelihood to be 
malnourished years later (p.16 [9]).  
Second, continues the HDR: ‘If the next 15 years of emissions follows the 
linear trend of the past 15, dangerous climate change will be unavoidable’ (p.15 
[8]). In fact, it already is, given the inertia in the natural systems involved (see 
e.g. Campbell et al., 2007). The spirit of the HDR message can be better 
conveyed by saying ‘even more dangerous climate change will be unavoidable, 
and will accelerate’, and will affect rich as well as poor. 
Third, the notion that we are not yet at the dangerous level, but are 
approaching it, is meant to generate a sense of urgency but it can operate in the 
reverse way, like the idea that there is a safe range for smoking. By giving the 
feeling that we have a safe space, it can induce inertia followed by the wistful 
hope that the real threshold is a bit further away than we were previously told. 
For example, the level of 450 ppm CO2-equivalent for greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) has widely become seen as a safe level, when it implies in fact a 50% 
chance of breaching the 2 degrees warming threshold. The HDR rightly points 
out that 450 ppm is not safe (p.14 [7]). However, the unsafe supposedly safe 
level (or even higher levels) become widely converted into targets calling for 
cuts of ‘at least X’ which become diluted in political practice to mean ‘at most 
X’. In the WDR the 2 degrees ceiling itself quickly gets downplayed: ‘From the 
perspective of development, warming much above 2°C is simply unacceptable’ 
(p.3; emphasis added) – but warming a bit above 2 degrees is left implicitly as 
tolerable, certainly from other perspectives than ‘development’ (meaning there 
                                                 
6  ‘Threshold(s)’ appears seven times in the HDR Overview, versus only once in the 
WDR Overview. 
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a concern for low-income nations and low-income people). For the WDR the 
target instead becomes ‘staying close to a 2°C warming’ (p.196). 
In comparison then to the WDR 2010 and some other prominent work, 
the HDR reads as bold and ethical, including in declaring already in 2007 450 
ppm as a target (p.29 [17]) when the Stern Review for the UK Government, 
led by the Bank’s former Chief Economist, had just adopted a target of 550 
ppm as politically palatable, even after it had acknowledged elsewhere that ‘550 
pm CO2-e would be a dangerous place to be’ (Stern 2007: 329). In face of the 
accumulating evidence of faster deterioration and greater risks, Stern later 
adjusted his target, though only to 500 ppm, in a 2009 book. 
The WDR portrays climate change as an urgent issue, but considerably 
less urgent than in the HDR. The HDR Overview uses four times the idea of 
‘window of opportunity’, a chance that must be taken within a fixed period or 
will be lost; the WDR Overview uses it not at all. Instead it presents figures of 
modest potential GDP losses: ‘a global average GDP loss of about 1 percent’ 
(p.5) and not more than a year’s foregone growth even in low-income 
countries.7 The figures are based on the relatively conservative 2007 IPCC 
climate projections and estimate the possible direct monetary costs of damage 
to agriculture, to coastal areas and so on; they ignore the other human costs 
and the indirect impacts of social and political unrest, conflict and migration, 
such as presaged in the Darfur crisis. The WDR Overview gives considerable 
space instead to discussions by economists about balancing the estimated 
monetary values of direct costs of climate change against costs of mitigation: 
‘In the major models, the benefits of stabilization exceed the costs at 2.5°C 
warming (though not necessarily at 2°C)’ (p.8), or even only perhaps at ‘well 
above 3°C’ (p.8). These ‘major models’ are by neoclassical economists who 
value effects according to market prices: ‘The optimal target is defined as the 
concentration that would result in the lowest reduction in the present value of 
global consumption’ (p.8); and they rely on in some cases obsolete estimates of 
the (in)sensitivity of various linkages. Such models do not impress many 
climate scientists.8  
3.2 The climate change – development link and the 
meaning of development 
Both reports emphasize that climate change is an obstacle for development; 
that ‘High levels of poverty and low levels of human development limit the 
capacities of poor households to manage climate risks’ (HDR p.16 [8]); that 
climate change is ‘drawing resources away from development’ (WDR p.1); and 
that high-income countries must reduce their emissions, but that developing 
countries still need ‘massive expansions’ (WDR p.1). They differ, however, on 
what trade-offs they see and indeed in how they interpret ‘development’. 
                                                 
7  McNeill (2010) notes how the present value of costs in a hundred years time from 
now can vary by a factor of 100 according to whether one uses the Stern Report rate 
of discount or that recommended by some mainstream economists. 
8  See e.g. a survey reported in http:www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-
change/climate-scientists-its-time-for-plan-b-1221092.html. 
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Climate change is placed by the WDR, from the outset, in a subordinate 
relation to ‘development’.9 It largely uses the concepts of development and 
(economic) growth interchangeably. For example, mitigation can be ‘without 
sacrificing growth’ (p.1), and, a few sentences later, is ‘compatible with 
furthering development’ (p.2). The same equivalence is found in successive 
sentences in the middle of the next column on p.2 and in many other places. 
The only difference in the WDR’s usage of the two terms appears to be that 
‘development’ is reserved for low-income countries. Damage is discussed 
largely in terms of GDP. 
The conception of development in the HDR is ‘human development’, 
‘human well-being and prosperity’ (p.3 [v]). It discusses damage in terms of 
people's quality of life and questions the dominant paradigm that equates 
development to unending economic growth. 
There could be no clearer demonstration than climate that economic wealth 
creation is not the same thing as human progress. Under the current energy 
policies, rising economic prosperity will go hand-in-hand with mounting threats 
to human development today and the well-being of future generations. But 
carbon-intensive growth is symptomatic of a deeper problem. One of the hardest 
lessons taught by climate change is that the economic model which drives 
growth, and the profligate consumption in rich nations that goes with it, is 
ecologically unsustainable. (UNDP, 2007: 15). 
While the WDR Overview says nothing on such issues for rich countries, the 
HDR Overview reiterates the message in its Conclusion: ‘economic wealth 
creation is not the same thing as human progress’ (p.27 [15]); and even if it 
were: ‘the profligate consumption in rich nations […] is ecologically 
unsustainable’ (p.27 [15]). But the HDR seems internally divided: the next 
paragraph in the Conclusion says ‘with the right reforms, it is not too late to 
cut greenhouse gas emissions to sustainable levels without sacrificing economic 
growth: […] rising prosperity and climate security are not conflicting objectives 
(p.27 [15]). To restrict this judgment to only low-income countries appears to 
have been too politically sensitive for a Conclusion section, even in the HDR. 
The WDR argues that some climate change policies have co-benefits in 
terms of growth and that climate change policy is not a choice between growth 
and the environment. The two goals can be combined, though particular 
patterns of consumption and production are dangerous. Development remains 
treated as economic growth, but new ways of growing have to be devised. The 
WDR goes further: ‘there is no reason to think that a low-carbon path must 
necessarily slow economic growth’ (p.7): no reason, even though climate-
proofing redirects resources and even though reorientation takes time.10 The 
arguments given are economic not ecological and consist of analogies with past 
environmental regulations. Here is a second fundamental premise in the WDR 
                                                 
9  Marianne Fay, the WDR’s Bank co-director, presents the Report as follows: ‘Our 
interest in climate change starts, and ends in many ways, with our interest in 
development’ (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9Kn1bD_5FU). 
10  The claim might become true by re-definition, if growth with adjustments to 
climate change is compared not with a world of projected continuing current growth, 
but with growth in a world of climate-related collapse. 
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(the first being that economic growth is required to remove poverty): 
economic growth does not need to be slowed in order to avoid dangerous 
climate change. This certainty is not allowed to be shaken by evidence 
elsewhere in the WDR, such as that: ‘the coal-fired power plants proposed 
around the world over the next 25 years are so numerous that their lifetime 
CO2 emissions would equal those of all coal-burning activities since the 
beginning of the industrial era. Only those facilities located close enough to the 
storage sites could be retrofitted for carbon capture and storage (if and when that 
technology becomes commercially available)’ (p.11; emphasis added). Investments 
already envisaged for the next couple of decades could lock the world into a 
high-emissions pattern. 
3.3 Inertia, hence urgency and a policy focus on LDCs 
Both the HDR and the WDR address inertia in the processes around climate 
change. The WDR extends the theme to more issues and declares ‘Inertia is 
the defining characteristic of the climate challenge’ (WDR: p.3). The first type 
of inertia, which both reports address, concerns the nature of climate change: the 
emissions of today affect GHG concentrations, temperatures and sea levels for 
hundreds or even thousands of years. So a delay in mitigation now makes it 
almost impossible to avoid crossing the threshold of 2ºC warming that both 
reports warn against. 
Both reports also consider inertia in economies. If changes are not made today 
in LDCs’ investment patterns, their economies will be locked—like those of 
rich countries—in patterns of production that will be very difficult and costly 
to change in the future. If already developed economies are seen as ‘locked’ in 
a specific model of production and consumption that is hyper-expensive to 
‘unlock’, then it is efficient to invest to avoid this model being adopted by 
LDCs. That the HDR Overview uses the structuralist language of ‘lock’ (seven 
uses) slightly more (and also ‘trap’ - five uses) is not surprising.11 But the WDR 
employs the additional language of ‘inertia’ in development processes that leads 
in the same direction. It highlights two further types of inertia that reduce 
speed of response. 
The next type affects research and development (R&D). According to the 
WDR, the time required for innovation and development of new technologies 
and energy sources is nearly always long. So, one must invest now in R&D in 
order to have the required technology and systems when they will be needed. 
The final type of inertia is related to the ‘ingrained’ behavior of individuals and 
organizations, which is difficult to change (p.20). The WDR mentions high 
risk-aversion, social norms that rigidify patterns of consumption and 
production, and the ways in which political leaders and managers make 
decisions. This last type of inertia, added to the previous ones and especially 
the rigidity of economies, implies the need to influence people's behaviour at 
                                                 
11  The HDR even says, out of structuralist habit, ‘regulatory standards can unlock 
double-dividends’ (p.22 [11]), and talks of a ‘mechanism for unlocking this win-win 
scenario’ (p.23 [12]). The WDR Overview uses the idea of socio-economic lock-in five 
times, and uses ‘trapping’ only for physical processes. 
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many levels, and to act on a great number of aspects of the lives of peoples of 
LDCs. The WDR places considerable emphasis here (see e.g. pp.17-18). 
Overall, the physical metaphors of locking and inertia give a picture of 
something fixed. The high-income economies are fixed in their models of 
production and consumption. So the policy focus should be on economies that 
are not yet fixed, those of the LDCs. The framing of the problem leads to the 
framing of the solution. 
3.4 Responsibility versus vulnerability 
Interconnection of different parts of the world in relation to climate change is 
stressed by both reports. Climate change is a global problem because emissions 
in one location affect other locations. This justifies a response that includes all 
countries and recognises that high-income countries ‘cannot continue to fill up 
an unfair and unsustainable share of the atmospheric commons’ (WDR p.1). 
Considering too countries’ different levels of development, both reports stress 
that they should respond differently to the challenge. 
While both reports mention inequality as a condition that worsens climate 
change hazards, the HDR refers to inequality between countries more. It 
strongly emphasises that while LDCs have contributed to climate change much 
less, they are more vulnerable to its impacts (e.g., p.9 [3]). The inequalities in 
terms of causal responsibility and of vulnerability, as well as the special needs 
of more vulnerable groups, justify financial transfers from high-income 
countries to LDCs.  
Both reports, especially the WDR, focus on one side of this unequal 
relationship: the victim, the developing countries. This creates a sense of 
solidarity and urgency, but it does not push people to question the other side: 
the high-income economies. The picture there is much vaguer. We know from 
the Reports that high-income economies are substantially responsible for what 
is happening and will happen, but we do not learn much about how, or how 
the problems of power in high-income economies (HIEs) could be addressed. 
Additionally, the image of victim can deny LDCs their own voice and capacity 
of action. In this perspective, the strong (causally) ‘responsible’ economies yet 
speak on LDCs’ behalf—via the multilateral organizations, dominated by 
HIEs. The ‘responsible’-‘vulnerable’ divide, while valid, can reinforce a system 
of international relations in which HIEs exert control over LDCs under the 
pretext that it is ‘our responsibility’ (now using the word in a second sense) to 
be in charge. 
 
3.5 Reduction of emissions and the ‘efficiency’ shift of 
attention from HIEs to LDCs 
Unlike the WDR, the HDR refers to power when analyzing the causes of the 
lack of emission reductions in HIEs. It points out that power imbalances 
between countries, and between different groups within the same country (let 
alone between the living and the unborn), have determined the negotiations 
agendas and their unsatisfactory results in terms of emissions. Lobbying by 
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powerful business groups is one reason why ‘caps on emissions have been set 
far too high’ in the European Union’s Trading System (HDR p.20 [11]). In 
contrast, the WDR, a huge report, does not mention the issue of power.12 The 
HDR does not proceed to openly advocate change in power systems, or open 
spaces to hear the voices of those who are silenced, but these seem implied. 
A key concept in both reports, but especially the WDR, through which 
attention is shifted to reduction of emissions in LDCs, is ‘efficiency’. 
According to the HDR ‘[l]ow levels of energy efficiency in developing 
countries are currently a threat to climate change mitigation efforts’ (HDR p.22 
[12]). The WDR advocates cuts in subsidies and increases in taxes for energy in 
LDCs, to give incentives for more efficient use. It argues that the required 
changes in agricultural practices and the use of land and water must occur in 
LDCs, ‘because agriculture in high-income countries is already close to 
maximum feasible yields’ (p.17). LDC agriculture must become more 
productive without increasing environmental damage; it must become more 
efficient like that in HIEs. The WDR does not explain in terms of what values 
some agricultural practices are considered efficient. Elements such as cultural 
factors, local knowledge, nutrition habits and needs, among others that may 
figure in people’s decision-making about resource use, are not considered in its 
assessment of what is ‘efficient’. Rural communities are assumed to be in need 
of modernization and technification, as it discusses in detail in its chapter 3.  
‘Efficiency’ can be an economic or a technical term. Typically it refers to 
the rate at which utilities or benefits are produced per quantum of resources 
invested; ‘efficient’ means attaining the maximum attainable (net) benefits. If 
the required output is a certain reduction in emissions compared to what they 
would otherwise have been, it is efficient to invest in LDCs, the Reports state, 
because less resources are required in order to achieve the output. However, if 
the efficiency that concerns us is in terms of human development per unit of 
emissions, then, due to the enormous needs in the LDCs, might it be more 
efficient to cut emissions in HIEs and redistribute emission quotas to LDCs? 
Besides judgments about what are priority benefits, judgments of efficiency are 
also relative to judgments about what is valid knowledge. 
Framing the problem in terms of ‘inertia’ and ‘efficiency’, as in the WDR, 
leads to putting the spotlight for policy action upon developing rather than rich 
countries. A focus on efficiency in energy use, as conventionally conceived, 
may shift attention from total emissions, for which HIEs are much more 
responsible, to inefficient usage, where LDCs are worse.  
                                                 
12  Of the WDR’s over 200 usages of ‘power’ and ‘powerful’, none relate to power 
imbalances or powerful groups. 
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3.6 A Human Rights issue? 
According to the HDR, climate change ‘raises profoundly important questions 
about social justice, equity and human rights across countries and generations’ 
(HDR p.8 [2]). The Report equates non-action in relation to climate change 
with a violation of human rights. It cites and endorses strong formulations 
such as ‘adaptation apartheid’ (pp.24 [13], 26 [18]) to describe a situation in 
which countries with more resources will be able to invest in adaptation, while 
countries with less income will not be prepared for the worst consequences of 
climate change. Hence the HDR calls for ‘stronger international commitment 
on adaptation’ (HDR p.13 [6]), in the name of human rights. 
In contrast, the WDR Overview has no mention of human rights and 
‘social justice’ in the whole Report. A text-box on ‘Ethics and climate change’ 
in Chapter 1 does touch on human rights (and has the one reference to 
‘justice’; p.53). It considers the possible use of human rights as a criterion to 
evaluate impacts of climate change, but focuses on use of formal legal 
channels, within which responsibility and harm must be decisively proven, and 
so lists consequent problems for taking human rights impact as a criterion of 
evaluation of climate change.13 However, law is not the only relevant channel 
for applying human rights concerns. Thus the HDR, in contrast, takes human 
rights as priority criteria that should influence policy-level design. 
In sum, the HDR frames the problem partly in terms of human rights and 
human development, with much emphasis on duties of rich countries. The 
WDR frames the problem more as one of inefficiency and inertia. In the next 
section we consider to what extent the differences in the problem-framings 
give rise to different proposed solutions. 
4 Framing the solutions 
We explore next the solutions that each report recommends. Interestingly, 
after the distinctly different problem-framings, the solution-framings are 
considerably closer. Both reports present a model that includes these features: 
1. Developing countries need more development. 
2. HIEs should adopt carbon-pricing: either a carbon tax or a cap-and-
trade system. 
                                                 
13  ‘Because the causes of climate change are diffuse, the direct link between the 
emissions of a country and the impacts suffered in another are difficult to establish in 
a litigation context. A further obstacle to defining responsibility and harm in legal 
terms is the diffusion of emissions and impacts over time: in some cases, the source of 
the harm has occurred over multiple generations, and the damages felt today may also 
by felt by many future generations.’ (WDR, p.53). Similar narrowly legal understanding 
of human rights is evident in the 2006 WDR on equity and development and in the 
internal Bank debates about the role of rights (McNeill and St. Clair, 2011). 
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 3. From these mechanisms, finances will be generated that should be 
administered by a multilateral mechanism, which will administer the 
transfer of finances and technology to the LDCs, for both mitigation 
and adaptation.  
4. These transfers will be programme-based. Developing countries will 
obtain finances and technologies, if they commit to quantitative goals 
and policy changes in terms of mitigation, adaptation and management 
of resources such as water, land, and energy. 
5. More free markets are necessary. For example, the HDR calls for free 
markets in international trade, so that e.g. low cost Brazilian ethanol 
could outcompete high cost Northern fuel supplies (HDR p.22). 
Less on the surface, the reports accept that in a world of nation-states the rich 
nation-states are not forced to make commitments. No global enforcement 
mechanisms are recommended, nor any mechanism that would make financial 
commitments automatic and obligatory. Even the HDR does not draw many 
institutional implications from its arguments about human rights and who 
bears responsibility for past damage. It does recommend ‘a national carbon 
budget in all developed countries with targets for reducing overall emissions 
from a 1990 reference year incorporated into national legislation’ (p.29). But it 
fails to clarify the principles of responsibility that are to guide action – which 
mixture of the principles of response-ability (‘ability to pay’) and causal 
responsibility (‘polluter pays’) is advocated, asks Opschoor (2008: 1199). The 
WDR stays with the vague term ‘equity’, and remains ‘singularly unclear about 
the principle of equity which should underlie [its] global deal’ (Storm, 2011: 
402). 
The reports implicitly appeal to the following: in the HDR, feelings of 
general sympathy and ‘imperfect obligation’; in both reports, enlightened self-
interest, a self-interest that is able to look beyond today and tomorrow to the 
longer-term; and, perhaps combining the two (Opschoor, 2008), identification 
of win-win options. Enlightened self-interest is often referred to, especially in 
the WDR, in the unthreatening language of ‘insurance’; unthreatening because 
it does not highlight the implied appeal to show concern for future 
generations. At other points the WDR adopts a more open language of 
enlightened self-interest, relying on rich countries to extend their calculations 
in terms of ‘self’ to their children and children’s children: ‘the losses implied by 
delays are so large that there are clear economic benefits for high-income 
countries committed to limiting dangerous climate change to finance early 
action in developing countries’ (WDR, p.12).14 The WDR makes no claim on 
the basis of broader sympathy and solidarity with poor countries, and relies on 
purported market solutions, rather than transfers to those in need. We look 
first at the basic commitment to more growth and development for poor 
countries; second at the ideas about insurance; and then at several of the 
detailed individual proposals. 
                                                 
14  Low birth rates in much of Europe and in Japan make it not obvious however 
whether enough rich country consumers have sufficient interest in future generations 
for a language of self-interest (‘all will be better off’ – WDR, p.56) that tacitly covers 
future generations to be sufficient to motivate present-day action. 
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4.1 The intermediate means: more development/growth 
Both reports see fighting climate change and fighting poverty as interrelated. 
According to the WDR, economic growth enhances the resilience of countries 
that are vulnerable to climate change. However, the Report also states that 
growth is not sufficient because it is not fast enough, can increase vulnerability 
to climate hazards, and is not equitable enough to assure that the poorest 
people will be protected (WDR p.7). Hence the Report frames the solutions to 
these problems in terms of growth pursued along a low-carbon path to reduce 
environmental hazards, and including adaptation measures to take care of the 
more vulnerable. 
This applies for low-income countries. We saw that for rich countries the 
HDR sometimes rejects such a position but sometimes hesitates. The WDR’s 
location in a development bank controlled by representatives of finance 
ministries in the US, Japan and Europe guarantees its silence on foregoing 
growth in rich countries. Instead it asserts that growth provides the resources 
to make all necessary transitions. ‘WDR 2010’s almost exclusive focus on “win-
win” techno-fixes suggests, without solid grounds, that the structural shift to a 
low carbon path can all be painless—without sacrificing growth and 
development’ (Storm, 2011: 400). Storm explores the full Report and suggests 
the flimsy basis of many components and the incoherence of the overall 
structure: ‘…serious climate stabilization is not consistent with strong global 
income growth …. However much WDR 2010 wants us to believe it’ (p.415). 
An agenda of ‘de-growth’ in rich countries cannot be avoided. But the World 
Bank’s political embedding seems to inevitably lead it to ‘irresponsible 
Micawberism’ (p.400). 
4.2 Insurance and reassurance 
‘Efficiency’ is a language of maximizing aggregate net benefits, whereas 
‘insurance’ is a language of covering against possibilities which are known to 
exist at aggregate level but whose disaggregated occurrence at some lower level 
cannot be predicted reliably. The Reports, especially the WDR, employ both 
languages. They portray climate-change related investment as an insurance to 
avoid the worst consequences of climate change: a familiar reassuring framing. 
The HDR stresses that we have sufficient certainty about climate change – 
the evidence is ‘overwhelming’ (p.12 [5], 14 [7]), ‘the debate is over and climate 
scepticism is an increasingly fringe activity’ (12 [5]). US $1 of pre-disaster 
prevention and preparation ‘can prevent losses of US $7’ (p.24 [14]). However 
there is uncertainty about effects in detail and their distribution, so that an 
insurance rationale is relevant; ‘if we value the well-being of our children and 
grandchildren, even small risks of catastrophic events merit an insurance-based 
precautionary approach’ (p.8 [2]).15  
Located next door to the US Congress and the fossil-fuel lobby, the World 
Bank is more cautious, but shares these conclusions. The WDR explains that 
                                                 
15  Opschoor is surprised that the HDR does not articulate and elaborate the 
precautionary principle from the Rio declaration; it is ‘mentioned only in passing by 
UNDP’ (Opschoor, 2008: 1196). 
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given the difficulties of using a simple cost-benefit analysis of climate change, 
plus the uncertainties about the potential ‘catastrophic risks’ of the 
phenomenon, it is justifiable to undertake ‘earlier and more aggressive action’, 
which can be seen as ‘climate insurance’ (WDR p.9). ‘Spending less than half a 
per cent of GDP [net] as ‘climate insurance’ could well be a socially acceptable 
proposition’ (p.9), though finding adequate financial systems and 
intermediaries will require attention. 
The WDR puts forward the argument for climate policy as insurance 
rather tentatively. It employs more hedging than normal, reflecting the implicit 
move beyond its usual aggregating economic cost-benefit calculations. The 
short paragraph about climate insurance on page 9 contains ‘may well’, ‘could 
be thought of’, and ‘could well be’. In contrast, hedging is absent when the 
Report later sums up its policy diagnosis, much of which is far more 
contentious: ‘The previous pages describe the many steps needed to manage 
the climate change challenge.’ (p.18). Why such hedging about insurance? An 
insurance argument in this context introduces an assumption of moral 
community, at some level or levels: across generations, within nations, between 
nations. Often the risks fall largely on the poor and the premiums on the rich. 
Climate change insurance is largely for the benefit of future generations, mostly 
abroad. Even if the argument is that HIEs should invest now in the efforts of 
developing countries in adaptation and mitigation, because this investment 
prevents future ‘catastrophic risks’ for all (p.9) – for example from an increase 
of migration flows from South to North due to climate change – there is a 
presumption of solidarity of the present day rich North with at least the future 
generations in the North. In other words the WDR discussion relies on moral 
premises that, unlike the HDR, it is not bold enough to recognize or discuss. 
4.3 Mitigation 
The WDR uses a language of ‘acting together’ (pp. 3-4, 10-11), in order to 
engage developing countries in the effort for mitigation and to involve HIEs in 
the effort for financing. Acting together diminishes the costs of mitigation for 
all; and postponing mitigation in developing countries because of lack of 
finances will greatly increase the cost of preventing more than a 2ºC 
temperature rise. In that sense, investing in mitigation in developing countries 
brings economic benefits not only for developing countries, but for high-
income countries as well. The WDR remains vague though about emissions 
ceilings for rich countries, let alone for poor countries. 
The HDR is again bolder and more emphatic. Its main mitigation strategy 
is for new emission limits for the post-2012 Kyoto Protocol period that must 
be consistent with the ‘global carbon budget’ (HDR p.19). That budget must 
be translated into ‘practical national strategies–and national carbon budgets’ 
(p.20 [10]). Reaching these emissions targets will be supported by grants and 
loans from a Climate Change Mitigation Facility (p.23 [12]). The HDR 
proposes that ‘any multilateral agreement without quantitative commitments 
from developing countries will lack credibility in terms of climate change 
mitigation’ (HDR p.28 [16]; also p.12).  
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The target of avoiding more than 2ºC warming requires further that by 
2050 rich nations reduce their emissions by at least 80 percent relative to levels 
of 1990, notes the HDR (p.15 [7]). While drawing on the same calculations by 
UNFCCC, IPCC and others, the WDR mentions the figure only in the fourth 
chapter of the whole Report, in a small text-box at the bottom of page 189, not 
in the Overview. The initial pages of the WDR address the importance of 
reducing emissions drastically, but the Overview does not state the percentage 
reductions required of HIEs. The WDR’s techno-optimism, married to a faith 
in the magic of markets, plus firm tutelage from HIE government 
representatives to the Bank, seem to mean that the fine details of feasibility are 
left hazy. While the Bank recognises the need for ‘almost complete de-
carbonization of the power sector’ (Storm, 2011: 410), it continues to fund vast 
coal-fired power stations and puts its faith in questionable scenarios of huge-
scale economical carbon-capture-and storage, bio-fuels production, and so on. 
Yet ‘half of the energy models reviewed in the [WD] Report conclude that the 
required de-carbonization (before 2050) is technologically infeasible (at 
acceptable costs, whatever that may mean)’ (loc. cit.).16 
4.4 Adaptation 
The WDR emphasises the urgency of investment in adaptation in LDCs. This 
covers ‘changing the kinds of risks people prepare for; where they live; what 
they eat; and the way they design, develop, and manage agroecological and 
urban systems’ (WDR p.10). The HDR goes even further. Given its different 
diagnosis of the problem – in terms of human rights impacts and human 
development impacts – it identifies relevant responses differently and more 
broadly. Policies for adaptation have to be integrated ‘into all aspects of policy 
development and planning for poverty reduction’ (HDR p.24 [13]); ‘Successful 
adaptation policies cannot be grafted on to systems that are failing to address 
underlying causes of poverty, vulnerability and wider disparities’ (p.27 [15]). It 
insists that HIEs are morally ‘obliged to support adaptation capacity 
development’ (p.25 [14]), and brings in the veiled threat of responding to 
damage by invoking ‘the legal principles of protection from harm and 
compensation for damage’ (p.25 [14]). It is outspoken about the ‘derisory’ 
response (p.25 [14]) so far by rich countries to help poor countries adapt to 
damage caused by the rich; and insists on the rich’s obligation to provide ‘new 
and additional’ support for adaptation, not divert other aid (p.26 [15]). 
4.5 Mobilisation and orchestration of the proximate means: 
technology and finances 
North-to-South transfer of technologies and finance, for both mitigation and 
adaptation, is a major topic in both reports. The WDR discusses it at special 
length, perhaps reflecting Bank ambitions to coordinate the transfers. It uses 
repeatedly the notion of a ‘global deal’ between high-income and developing 
countries, including a package of agreements on innovation, transfer and 
                                                 
16  Some of the HDR authors too believe in the optimistic techno-vision of CCS (p.22 
[12] & 30 [18]). 
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adaptation of technology, and a supporting system for financing and 
administration. The WDR Overview employs the term ‘deal’ (as a noun) 
sixteen times, as in ‘global deal’; the HDR Overview not at all.17 
Sufficient finance flowing to developing countries—combined with capacity 
building and access to technology—can support low-carbon growth and 
development. If mitigation finance is directed to where mitigation costs are lower 
[developing countries], efficiency will increase. If adaptation finance is directed to 
where the needs are greatest, undue suffering and loss can be avoided. Climate 
finance offers the means to reconcile equity, efficiency, and effectiveness in 
dealing with climate change (WDR p. 22). 
Some elements of the WDR ‘deal’ deserve mention. First, international 
transfers of clean technologies, cost-sharing agreements, and financial support 
for the incremental cost of adopting new technologies must be included. 
Second, pricing carbon through carbon taxes or cap-and-trade will generate 
finance, though most finance required for infrastructure will come via the 
private sector (WDR p. 24). Third, the role of the public sector is to create 
incentives for climate action, including incentives and flexible regulation for 
private infrastructure service providers, and to supply information and 
education and eliminate market failures. And last, says the WDR, the deal must 
be acceptable for high-income countries, which means their competitiveness 
must not suffer, especially in relation to middle income countries (p. 22). 
The HDR strongly advocates financial and technology transfers as well 
(p.23 [13]), but it frames the issues more in terms of responsibility and social 
justice (p.28 [16]), and does not refer to maintaining HIE competitiveness. For 
pricing carbon in HIEs, via carbon taxes and/or cap-and-trade mechanisms to 
generate finance, it takes the same line as the WDR.  
4.6 Multilateral mechanisms 
Both reports advocate a planned, controlled and orchestrated process of 
development in LDCs. Who will plan, control and orchestrate? Both reports 
see a multilateral mechanism as ideal to manage financial and technological 
transfers from HIEs to LDCs. Various statements in the WDR suggest the 
Bank’s wish to position itself centre-stage in not just the climate change debate 
but in climate funds management. It stresses the expertise needed for 
managing climate finance, and how 'the aid experience does offer critical 
lessons’ (p.22), including on the need for centralization rather than having 
innumerable funders. It repeatedly emphasises that designing and 
implementing an international agreement and international transfers ‘is no 
trivial matter’ (p.2); ‘…action must be enabled by an efficient and effective 
international agreement, one that factors in development realities’ (p.19), thus 
hinting at a new ‘deal’ for the World Bank too, the development knowledge 
bank. 
                                                 
17  Forester (2009) warns against the restrictive conception of bargaining a ‘deal’, for it 
rests on a picture of given, fixed identities and purposes, and obscures many 
opportunities and dangers. 
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The HDR’s concluding recommendations open with a section headed 
‘Develop a multilateral framework…’ (p.29 [17]). But in some contrast to the 
WDR, and in line with UNDP tradition, it argues that: ‘While project-based 
support has an important role to play, the locus for adaptation planning has to 
be shifted towards national programmes and budgets’ (p.27 [15]). 
4.7 Market mechanisms – 1. carbon pricing, plus market 
regulation 
Both Reports emphasize the role of markets to raise finance and re-incentivize 
activity. According to the HDR’s Foreword, price mechanisms should be used 
instead of quotas (p.5 [vii]); and ‘putting a price on carbon emissions [is] the 
starting point’ (HDR p.20 [10]), which can be done through either a carbon tax 
or cap-and-trade. The HDR seems not to mind which, and its final list of 
recommendations includes suggestions for both options (p.29 [17]). Indeed, of 
the two reports, the WDR seems relatively more inclined to a carbon tax. 
The reports agree that a global carbon market is a long-term project, not 
something to be prioritized now. In the short run the markets will not be 
global, because ‘the world lacks the required governance system’ (HDR p.20 
[11]). The HDR proposes ‘rich countries [should] develop carbon pricing 
structures [and] [a]s these structures evolve, developing countries could be 
integrated over time as institutional conditions allow’ (HDR p.20 [11]). The 
WDR gives a similar discussion in its later chapters. 
The HDR recognises too that ‘market pricing alone will not be enough’ 
for carbon (p.13 [5]), given the numerous forms of market failure seen in 
carbon trading. It cites the bizarre experiences of the Emission Trading 
Scheme in Europe, subject to real political pressures (p.20 [11]). Governments 
must set regulatory standards and support low-carbon research, development 
and deployment (HDR p.21 [11]). Although the influence of power groups in 
the determination of the caps for emissions is acknowledged in the Report, 
Opschoor complains that the ‘analysis remains superficial. So does the 
discussion on the flaws of [the Clean Development Mechanism]’ (2008: 132), a 
scheme of ‘smoke and mirrors’ that too readily generates fraudulent supposed 
greenhouse-gas offsets (measured against notional benchmarks) that are 
bought by high-emitters to permit them to continue high emissions. 
The WDR concurs with the HDR in its optimistic treatment of regulation. 
It suggests very high potential returns exist from ‘Efficiency standards and 
labeling programs’, as well as by redesigning power utility companies’ contracts 
(p.15). The Report remarks that ‘in the absence of a global enforcement 
mechanism, the incentives for meeting global commitments are domestic’ 
(WDR p.19). This could be read as a conditional ‘if-then’ proposition, but it is 
treated as a ‘since-therefore’ proposition. Major cuts on emissions must 
happen in the high-income economies if the 2ºC ceiling is to be respected; yet 
while developing countries will be subjected to various enforcement 
mechanisms, as a condition to receive financial and technological transfers, 
there will not be internationally binding commitments and enforcement 
mechanisms for the high-income economies. 
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4.8 Market mechanisms – 2. International trade 
Both Reports incline towards open global product markets. The HDR’s 
mitigation strategy includes expansion of alternative fuels markets: 
‘international trade could play a much larger role in expanding markets for 
alternative fuels’, such as ethanol (HDR, p.22 [12]). The WDR argues the same 
(p.308) and advocates open markets in general. The same device that it used 
regarding economic growth and poverty reduction—to presume that they form 
an indissoluble package—is used for trade and market stability: ‘To ensure 
adequate water and nutrition for all, the world will have to rely on an improved 
trade system less prone to large price shifts’ (p.14). ‘Improved’ is equated to 
more open and global, on the grounds that more integrated world markets will 
allow LDCs access to rich country markets when LDCs have surpluses, and 
will allow resources to enter LDCs from outside when required and thereby 
reduce local price fluctuations. But integrated markets allow food to be moved 
out to areas of higher purchasing power, away from poor people, and they 
allow food crops to be displaced by more lucrative production for global 
markets on land from which poor people have been displaced too. For the 
WDR, markets will ensure prices that reflect scarcities and induce scarcity-
reducing innovation. Storm (2011) comments on the lack of discussion of the 
interests of ‘rural landless workers, the urban poor and the non-agricultural 
workers’ as food prices rise (p.409), and on the assumptions that markets in 
poor countries will generate the historically unprecedented required agricultural 
productivity rises as climate deteriorates and populations rise. ‘The discrepancy 
between “required” yield growth and “likely yield growth with moderate 
warming” is huge in the developing world, but rather small in the rich 
regions…[Further,] The principal uncertainties in the estimates are all on the 
downside’ (Storm p.409). 
4.9 Market mechanisms – 3: Economic regimes in LDCs 
The WDR anticipates that climate change will threaten the availability of food 
and water for all countries, so that international cooperation is required. The 
Report focuses on an area that is considered much less in the HDR: changes in 
the management of energy supply, agricultural practices, water and other 
resources in LDCs. To cut GHG emissions in LDCs without sacrificing 
growth, the WDR advocates higher fuel taxes and reduction of energy 
subsidies (pp.14-15). In contrast, it says nothing in the Overview about energy 
prices, subsidies and taxes in high-income economies, such as the USA. These 
pricing measures in LDCs should be accompanied, according to the WDR, by 
other tools for advancing energy efficiency, such as norms, regulatory reform 
and financial incentives that attract private power companies. Such reforms are 
not scheduled for the North because rich countries are supposedly ready for 
adapting without help, according to both reports. Proposals to further privatize 
energy supply would leave national states with less control and capacity of 
action to manage shocks related to energy. Given the unequal technological 
capacities of high-income countries and developing countries, added to 
increasing openness of markets, control over energy production would lie in 
the hands of international investors. The opening of LDC markets fits as part 
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of a move to greater control over resources in LDCs by powerful market 
actors, funding agencies and, indirectly, rich country governments. The HDR 
says far less on systems for the management of resources in LDCs, but the 
multilateral mechanisms that it envisages might open the door for these in 
weaker economies. 
5 Two ways of  approaching the future? 
The structured comparison of the problem-framing and solution-framing in 
the two Reports, guided by attention to key vocabulary, has given us several 
insights compared to the earlier review essays by Opschoor (2008) and Storm 
(2011). We have two major findings. 
First, the HDR 2007/8 and the WDR 2010 represent importantly 
different perspectives on the problem of climate change in relation to low-
income people. For the Human Development Report the problem is a 
fundamental civilizational issue, in which the basic life quality and even 
sometimes the lives of poor people--‘rural communities in Bangladesh, farmers 
in Ethiopia and slum dwellers in Haiti’ (p.10 [3])--are endangered, in large 
degree by actions by others, in rich countries, who have a compelling moral 
obligation to provide support and to modify their current patterns of living. 
Thus the HDR makes frequent use of terms and phrases like ‘the world’ 
(including as an actor, such as ‘If the world acts now…’;  p.10 [3]), ‘humanity’, 
‘the world’s poor’, ‘the international community’, ‘human community’, ‘our 
children’, ‘our children and grandchildren’, ‘future generations’, ‘the world’s 
poor and future generations’. None of this language characterises the World 
Development Report (see Table 1).18 Its Overview never mentions 
grandchildren or future generations, and rarely employs even the pronoun ‘we’, 
the indicator of shared fate and shared concern and commitment. Its favoured 
terms are ‘manage’ and ‘efficiency’. The contrast of vocabularies shown by 
Table 1 is stark and revealing.  
Besides these local messages we need to look at the overall messages, so 
Section 3 compared the main problem specifications across the two 
Overviews, and Section 4 did so for their policy designs. Section 3 confirmed 
that they specify the problem situation in importantly different ways. The 
WDR evinces less urgency, reflecting its relatively greater concern with 
monetary magnitudes and hence implicitly with the interests of those with 
more resources to protect themselves from possible future stresses. The 
HDR’s reliance on a currency of human welfare highlights that lives can be 
broken and stunted, and contributes to its greater sense of urgency and 
willingness to query unending economic growth in rich countries. The Reports 
share ideas about inertia and lock-in, which generate urgency but which,  
                                                 
18  Table 1 distinguishes word-occurrences in the HDR Overview and 
Foreword/Contents. Their sum (plus occurrences in the front matter) gives the total 
count for the downloadable file. The HDR Overview is electronically available as a file 
that includes front matter and the Foreword, itself a major statement that functions as 
close partner to the Overview. The WDR 2010’s Foreword is far less significant, only 
a third the length, presented in a separate file, and functionally distinct. 
  26
TABLE 1 
 Vocabularies of the Overview chapters in HDR 2007/8 and WDR 2010 
We 56 (29) 11 [2] 
children 11 (3) 3 
our children 4 (2) 0 
grandchildren 3 (1) 0 
future generations 19 (0) 0 
the world’s poor and future generations 6 (0) 0 
the world’s poor 17 (0) 0 
the poor [as a noun;  in addition to uses of ‘the world’s poor’] 12 (0) 1 [1] 
the world 32 (8) 13 [6] 
human 102 (19) 8 [2] 
humanity 8 (0) 1 
community/communities 11 (2) 9 
the international community 2 (1) 1 
global community 1 (0) 0 
human community 2 (0) 0 
climate smart 0 (0) 9 
efficiency/efficient/inefficient/inefficiency 21 (1) 48 (4) 
effective 2 12 
 
consumption 7 (0) 19 (0) 
threshold/s 7 (0) 1 [1] 
catastrophe/s/catastrophic 13 (2) 7 [2] 
‘indow of opportunity 3 (0) 0 
insurance/ insurers/ insure 3 (3) 16 [2] 
climate insurance 0 (0) 5 
precaution / precautionary 1 (0) 1 
 
fight 5 (4) 1 
challenge/s 27 (6) 10 [2] 
can 32 (3) 77 (3) 
manage/(mis)management/mismanaging 6 (0) 26 [8] 
 
together with a standard market-based conceptualisation of ‘efficiency’, direct 
attention primarily towards influencing the faster-growing LDCs. 
Our second major finding is that, following the significantly different 
diagnoses, the two reports are surprisingly similar in major policy proposals: a 
carbon price in rich countries, which will help to finance a global insurance 
system of efficient mitigation measures and prudent adaptation measures in 
poorer countries and support the growth that those countries need; a 
multilateral mechanism for conditional, expert, program-based planning and 
disbursement of the support; which together with an increased reliance on 
global markets will imply greater control by powerful global actors over LDC 
economies, in contrast to a lack of multilateral enforcement mechanisms for 
rich countries. There are also differences: the HDR calls for carbon budgets 
for all countries and more program flexibility for LDCs, and is explicit about 
the ethical underpinnings—solidarity over time and obligations of rich 
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countries arising from the damage to others that they are responsible for—
which together imply (but here the HDR hesitates) limits to further economic 
growth in rich countries; whereas the WDR tries to proceed with only a 
language of enlightened self-interest and win-win ‘deals’, with no talk of 
Northern obligations or self-limitation, let alone of human rights. Yet the bulk 
of the proposals are the same. 
Following its stress on human rights and ethical principles, the HDR does 
relatively little to apply those ideas in policy proposals (Opschoor, 2008: 1201). 
Whether the key constraints are the training of its staff in economics schools in 
the North, its lesser budget compared to the World Bank’s research resources, 
political pressures within and upon a multilateral agency, or stubborn reality, 
would require a separate study to try to answer. Fault lines may be sensed 
between the HDR’s Foreword, co-written by Kemal Dervis, the UNDP 
Administrator, who had spent a quarter-century in the World Bank, and its 
Overview, led by Kevin Watkins, who had spent most of his career in Oxfam, 
which espouses a rights-based approach. The Foreword, while steeped in ‘We’ 
language, insists on the priority of market solutions (p.5 [vii]). The HDR 
2007/8 seems a classic UN report, influenced by inspiring humanist 
perspectives but with relatively limited resources for research and little 
associated funding for programs with which to induce others to accept its 
ideas. It is perhaps then led to propose a synthetic set of practical measures 
that do not offend potential funders and largely rely on proposals worked out 
by richer agencies. 
In contrast, the WDR represents a working-out of a mainstream economic 
vision of a world smoothly ordered by corporations and markets, and is 
marked by convenient omissions and techno-optimism wherever required for 
maintaining this vision (Storm, 2011) and by absence of self-reflection 
regarding the models of development that have led to the climate crises in the 
first place. In the WDR’s organizational and intellectual context, climate 
change and poverty are technical problems to be addressed by economic policy 
and technological innovation, tasks to be led by the development aid 
bureaucracies and global business.19 They are problems that will be resolved, 
not intensified, by economic growth. Societies become judged then according 
to their aggregate consumption achievements, more than by the way they treat 
their most vulnerable members; and market-based ‘solutions’ are put forward 
to whatever ‘local difficulties’ may arise, such as climate change (O’Brien et al. 
2009; St.Clair, 2009). ‘Economic growth alone is unlikely to be fast or equitable 
enough to counter threats from climate change’ acknowledges the WDR in one 
of its summary ‘Main Messages’, but this can supposedly be compensated for 
by the carbon-pricing and multilateral-guided programs for mitigation and 
adaptation that the WDR outlines. 
Discourse analysis of various types could help in further exploring the 
Reports’ Overviews and the Reports as a whole. One might look for generative 
metaphors and notable silences; for example, the WDR contains very little on 
                                                 
19  The WDR adopts the role of the expert. Its Overview adds the emphasiser ‘clear’ in 
respect of reasoning or conclusions eight times; the HDR Overview does so only 
once. 
  28
sustainable consumption, consumption reduction and redirected 
consumption.20  One could examine the visual orchestration of messages by 
the use of text boxes, titles, and pictures: the ‘hooks’ that grab attention; and 
the language traditions that are invoked, such as the HDR’s occasional use of 
quasi-Biblical language, including in its Overview.21 One could look too at 
syntax as well as vocabulary. The WDR’s language consultant was Bruce Ross-
Larson, best-selling author of Stunning Sentences and Powerful Paragraphs. The 
WDR Overview has a fondness for sentences and paragraphs that start with 
‘But’, and for American colloquialisms like ‘put[ting] climate on the back 
burner’ (p.3), ‘Making it happen’ (p.18), and its theme-tune ‘A climate-smart 
world is within reach’ (section title, p.10). These features could indicate an 
American or Americanized intended or assumed primary audience. 
In the current debate on the relations between climate and development, 
support is building for critical views such as expressed in the HDR 2007/8 
(Books, Grist and Brown 2009; Lohman, 2006, 2011; Storm ed. 2009). But the 
HDR 2007/8 does not yet convert its critique far into a distinctive policy 
approach. Its structuralist belief in ‘lock-in’ already in the North, and fear of an 
imminent high-carbon ‘lock-in’ too in the South, leads it to share the 
mainstream preference to focus on change of direction in the South, not the 
North. This leaning may be exacerbated by its residual adherence sometimes to 
a decontextualized notion of ‘efficiency’ as judged in market terms (i.e. 
according to market purchasing power, rather than in terms of human 
development values). Given then, its belief in ‘the fierce urgency of the now’, 
the HDR rushed to a full policy package -- designed in terms of instruments 
already available on the tables of its member-state governments. 
The United Nations Intellectual History Project (1999-2010) concluded 
that to achieve practical impact a movement of ideas needs, first, an intellectual 
vision, consistent with and partnered by—second—an inspiring set of values; 
and further, that these two must become action-relevant by—third—being 
operationalised in action-agendas and methodologies and practical proposals, 
and, fourth, institutionalised in organizations, processes and networks that 
carry the ideas forward and continually press for their use (Jolly, Emmerij, 
Weiss, 2009). The HDR 2007/8 may have fallen short in the fourth respect, its 
network of active cooperators, and especially (and consequently) in the third 
respect—conversion of its vision and values into practical means rather than 
taking over means that have been devised to express different visions and 
values. By implication, a new Human Development Report on climate change 
could be appropriate, whether by UNDP or others, to go further with that 
conversion, on the basis of insights from a broader network. 
                                                 
20  E.g. the WDR takes for granted that ‘richer people eat more meat’ (p.16). Figure 2 
of the WDR points to benefits from switching in the US from SUVs to saloon cars, 
but does not raise what Storm (2011) considers the real need: to drive less. 
21  E.g.: ‘the world’s poor walk the Earth with a light carbon footprint’ (HDR p.9 [3]) 
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